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Since the end of the Cold War, the US Department of Defense has embarked on a series of studies and force planning
efforts in an attempt to adjust its military strategies and force structure to an uncertain future. The most recent of these
efforts have taken the form of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and its congressionally mandated corollary, the
report of the National Defense Panel (NDP).[1] Despite congressional hopes that the QDR and NDP might produce
alternative defense strategies and forces that could be compared side-by-side, that is not the way it turned out. The
QDR took a relatively short-term look, expanded the scope of DOD's Bottom-Up Review (BUR), and kept major
programs and budget projections essentially on track. The NDP adopted a longer-range view, called for additional
funding to support a "transformation strategy" that would enable a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), and
questioned the future and rationale of certain major DOD programs.
Both studies note the tension between managing near-term threats and preparing to meet longer-term challenges,
suggesting that there will be considerable pulling and hauling over the next few years as defense priorities and funding
are manipulated to meet those competing needs. Both reports also recognize the importance of using wargames and
experimentation to explore the military doctrines, operational concepts, and organizational arrangements needed to take
advantage of the emerging RMA, as well as to develop and test "concepts and capabilities that will ensure the ability to
transform for the future."[2] To assure Congress that his department had such work already under way, Secretary of
Defense William Cohen, in a response to the NDP, described the number and variety of "transformation activities" that
DOD has undertaken to improve understanding of the future security environment. In that response, he termed
wargames a "critical tool for ensuring senior decisionmakers, joint force commanders, and their staffs are able to
maximize 21st-century warfighting capabilities."[3]
As the nation embarks on a course of wargaming (defined in the 1999 Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the
President and the Congress as "carefully constructed simulations in which experienced civilian and military players . .
. must make decisions regarding the use of force in the context of a future conflict scenario") and experimental
exercises, it is important that those simulations seek basic truths about future military operations. But they must also
reflect the realities of joint battlefields. All too often the outputs of wargames have been limited to their training value,
or have been skewed because the players were allowed to take the future where they wanted it to go. Wargames
frequently have been compressed into service-specific views and repertoires so that they validate, rather than
challenge, current operational procedures and priorities. Our thesis is that wargaming will fail to meet the expectations
of US defense planners unless the search for basic understanding of the future of war is coupled with the application
and testing of these understandings in a joint arena.
The Basic and Applied Research of Wargaming
Wargaming is an established and time-honored mechanism through which proposed defense concepts, doctrine, and
tactics are explored, and there is a rich literature that describes its uses and applications.[4] An attempt to develop a
typology of wargaming would be quite complicated, however, and that is not our purpose here. Rather, if we categorize
these efforts very generally, we note that one major use of wargaming is to examine what concepts, ideas, capabilities,
or doctrines appear to have utility given a range of alternative futures, particularly for emerging or not-yet-fielded
platforms and weapons. The best examples of these wargames may be the innovative games and chart maneuvers
conducted at the Naval War College during the interwar period and, more recently, the Air Force series of Global

Engagement games in which airborne lasers, space planes, and space-based lasers were assumed to be operational in
2012.[5] A second use of wargaming is to explore how best to use the platforms and forces we plan to acquire in
realistic future scenarios. Examples of this form of wargaming include the Navy's GLOBAL war games which
developed new ways for naval forces to deter and defeat a Cold War adversary. Wargames have also been used, not
always satisfactorily, to test the adequacy of current or planned forces in projected or official scenarios, such as those
offered in support of the BUR and the QDR. Finally, of course, wargames can be used for other than analytical
purposes, such as familiarizing key players with the capabilities of a specific armed service.
Given these different uses of wargames, it is not evident just what kind of gaming might be most useful in helping
DOD deal with the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era. Certainly service-specific games (often referred to as "Title
10 games" in reference to the legislation authorizing the services to conduct wargames in support of their "organize,
train, and equip" functions) will continue to have relevance. However, as noted above, single-service wargames find it
easy to avoid the tough choices likely to be generated in a joint environment. If, as former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs General John Shalikashvili observed, the future of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team, then
we must look for increasing interservice play from our games, simulations, and experiments. Too much of our current
wargaming lies within the bounds of the separate services, neither examining complementary joint capabilities nor
raising such issues as trade-offs between land, naval, and air forces. Moreover, the official gaming in support of major
DOD reviews has tended to confirm the adequacy of current plans and programs under favorable assumptions, rather
than to stress the planned force with challenges such as surprise attack, denial of in-theater basing, or asymmetric
threats.
Nevertheless, we know that wargaming has proved fruitful in the past, particularly in times such as these when the
United States has been granted breathing space allowing for innovation and experimentation. But taking advantage of
this strategic pause demands the right kind of wargaming. Unfortunately, not only is categorizing wargaming by use or
purpose problematic, it is also not particularly helpful in suggesting the kind of gaming that needs to be done in the
years ahead. As an alternative, therefore, we would like to borrow the long-standing dichotomy between basic and
applied scientific research as a more practical way of categorizing wargames. This perspective will suggest a fresh
analytical approach that can help us make better use of wargaming in thinking about and planning for an uncertain
future.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has viewed scientific research in much the same way as Vannevar
Bush described it in his enormously influential report to President Harry Truman, Science, the Endless Frontier. Bush,
the head of the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development, stressed the need to have an almost
Jeffersonian "separation of church and state" approach toward the funding and support of basic versus applied
research.[6] In this context, basic research is motivated solely by a desire to contribute to the existing store of general
knowledge, while applied research is directed toward a well defined use for an expected product.[7]
Bush's paradigm can best be envisioned as a linear one, in which basic research lies at the left end of a onedimensional spectrum and applied research at the right. The seminal influence of this model can be charted to this day
in the Department of Defense, where both focus and funding remain compartmented in separate segments of a
sequence leading from basic to applied research, then to engineering manufacturing development, and finally to
production. This linear approach to research methodology presumes that fundamental inquiry drives but always
remains separate from practical applications. Recent rethinking, however, has subjected this linear relationship to
substantial revision, with implications for both the process and products of wargaming.
In his book reexamining the relationship between basic science and technological innovation,[8] Donald E. Stokes
suggested a more imaginative way of illustrating the interaction of scientific inquiry and application. By adapting the
linear model positing a straightforward progression from basic to applied science, Stokes produced instead a matrix
with four quadrants that more accurately depicts how scientific research can be inspired by a desire for knowledge or
for intended application. His model (Figure 1) illustrates that scientific research may be guided by a quest for pure
understanding, by a drive for practical utility, or by some combination of both.[9]

Figure 1. The Stokes Research Matrix.

Within this matrix, Stokes places Niels Bohr in the pure research quadrant: in concentrating on basic research, Bohr
displayed little interest in any practical application of his model of the atom. He simply sought fundamental
knowledge. Thomas Edison, by contrast, is placed in the pure applied research quadrant, suggesting that he cared little
about the theory of electrons as long as he could get a light bulb to glow brightly for some usable length of time.
Stokes's model also has a quadrant for Louis Pasteur, a man driven not only by the desire to understand the whys and
hows of disease transmission, but also by a wish to protect people from milk-borne tuberculosis. If we accept this
framework as a more faithful depiction of the relationship between basic research and applied knowledge, what are its
implications for future wargaming?
Wargaming Quadrants
A quick application of this quadrant framework to the process and products of wargaming suggests the following.
Bohr's quadrant of pure research has been left largely to academics, who have speculated on the evolution of
aggression in human nature, man's proclivity for violence, and how the world's population might avoid Armageddon in
spite of itself. Public and privately funded think tanks have occupied Bohr's quadrant for the purpose of predicting
future international conflicts and examining how those conflicts might be deterred. RMA games, such as those
conducted by the Air Force and the Navy to explore the varied concepts of operations and requirements generated by
those alternative futures, also fit in this box.
However, for most of the last half century the armed services of the United States have necessarily been focused on
application-inspired research, housed in Edison's quadrant. This has entailed conducting wargames involving a welldefined enemy--the former Soviet Union--with established intelligence-projected intentions and existing or planned
military capabilities. The principal question of the applied wargaming effort was, given the services' existing force
structures and the presumption that deterrence has failed, who would win, by how much, and what could be done to
improve those forces to reduce any unfavorable consequences or outcomes.
Naturally, insights into basic issues happen along the way of practical application, and gaming efforts such as the
Naval War College's GLOBAL exercises provided such a perspective.[10] But these insights generally have proved to
be the exception. The Air Force's Global Engagement series of games also probably lies in Edison's quadrant, given its
purpose of helping combatant command staffs incorporate air and space capabilities into their near-term planning.
Unfortunately, according to some participants, this focus is occasionally obscured through the insertion of parochial
agendas by agencies seeking to gain support for particular plans or programs. In the worst of cases, some gaming
efforts are contrived to underwrite the need for certain numbers of platforms or weapon systems in a disingenuous
bending of wargaming rules to support objectives previously prioritized by bureaucratic and organizational
imperatives.

There is, of course, a continuing need for good, service-specific gaming in Edison's quadrant. However, as we seek to
balance the nation's military capabilities under growing commitments and constrained resources, there will be a
growing requirement for wargames to present issues of force structure trade-offs. Current thinking around singleservice-dominated game tables rejects the proposition that the services could ever agree on a common scenario to test
joint warfighting and to explore such trades. Surely that concern is overdrawn; the speculative nature of wargames
precludes their outcomes from providing anything close to final resolution of such thorny issues as budget shares or
debates over roles and missions. However, insights into the relative merits of alternative forces--unlikely to be
generated by any other artifice--can be derived from the wargaming of well-structured joint scenarios.
But if we are to apply Pasteur's method of research to the friction-filled future of war successfully, the first step must
be to better define the problem. Pasteur's quadrant, which seeks both basic knowledge and its application, requires the
questioning of elemental assumptions as well as a comprehensive survey of plausible solutions. Recall that even such
an enthusiastic advocate of mechanized warfare as George S. Patton maintained that lots of horses would still be
required to haul supplies to his fast-moving motorized forces.[11] Our future Pattons must be encouraged both to seek
an understanding of the future of warfare, and to consider and weigh the winning elements in military practice. As
Stokes points out, "Pasteur wanted to understand and to control the micro-biological processes he discovered," just as
the scientists and generals leading the Manhattan Project wanted to "understand and to harness nuclear fission."[12] If
future warfighters are to understand and to manipulate the instruments of modern warfare, the contemporary
wargaming process must include conceptual thinking at a joint level, rather than only at a service-specific level.
Obviously, service-derived insights into the unique capabilities brought by each combat arm must be credibly
represented in these simulations. But those views should be seen as adding value owing to their understanding of
unique capabilities, not by their singular dedication to service programs and priorities.
The recent Army After Next (AAN) wargames conducted by the Army Training and Doctrine Command seem to be
moving in the right direction. Deliberately set out beyond the Army's near-term budget projections, the AAN games
test increased mobility, enhanced firepower, and reduced logistic requirements without dictating how much an armored
fighting vehicle should weigh, nor defining precisely how many troops are in a "Battle Force."[13] When these
theoretical concepts are coupled with practical applications--for example, testing the rapid deployment of lighter
ground forces against the availability of supporting fires from joint, relatively long-range assets--the value of gaming
the entire process through is revealed.
Of course, wargaming in Pasteur's quadrant is not entirely new. During the mid-1930s, Marines at Quantico perceived
that the Navy and Army Air Corps would require advanced island bases to project military power across the Pacific,
and that these prospective island bases would be heavily defended by Japanese forces.[14] However, as a result of the
British debacle at Gallipoli during World War I, conventional military wisdom dictated that no amphibious assault
could be successfully conducted in the face of modern weaponry. Hence, there were no programs to design and build
amphibious assault vessels, large or small. In spite of this formidable ideological barrier, the Marines gamed these
contingencies, developing the strategy and tactics to execute a successful beach landing despite armed opposition, and
speculated on the types of platforms that would support such an operation. This innovation, given the joint requirement
driving it, was certainly an early form of gaming in Pasteur's quadrant.
We'd like to push this analogy between research and wargaming just a bit further. Let us posit, based on this
framework for analysis, that the QDR lies in Edison's quadrant (pure applied research) and the NDP resides in Bohr's
(pure basic research). In other words, the QDR speaks about what we could do with the service-specific forces and
platforms we plan to have, and how many more or less of them we need. The NDP, on the other hand, addresses what
concepts appear to have future utility, and calls for increased joint operations in the future, but carefully avoids those
pesky and politically unpopular force trade-off issues. If we plan to conduct meaningful wargames supporting these
study efforts, what would a gaming analogue to Pasteur's quadrant of use-inspired basic research look like? Is jointness
a necessary ingredient in wargaming designed to effectively unite theories about the future of conflict with practical
prescriptions for deterrence and defense? The answer is yes.
Joint Wargaming in Pasteur's Quadrant
Joint wargaming in Pasteur's quadrant should combine the QDR's programmatic thinking with the experimentation

called for in the NDP. Such an approach could inquire into the feasibility and desirability of the RMA while
suggesting acceptable and affordable paths to transition to it. Admittedly, given the separate services' need to support
their near-term priorities, it is difficult for them to structure wargames that might question programs high on the
combatant commanders' Integrated Priority Lists. And the far term--2020 and beyond--clearly remains the province of
the services' long-range visions. However, there may be a time span just beyond the Future Years Defense Program,
but not far in the future, that could profit from joint wargaming in Pasteur's quadrant.
If we adopted such a research method, what are the key concepts waiting to be tested in a Pasteur's quadrant joint
wargame? Some, certainly, are contained within QDR recommendations and Joint Vision 2010, while the ambitious
agenda set by the NDP can provide another course of action. In addition, there are several functional areas getting a lot
of attention in wargames these days that, from our perspective, seem particularly ripe for joint exploration. They
include stealth, long-range precision strike, reduced logistic footprints, and command and control.
Stealth
Some joint commanders may not be sure of what "stealth" is, but they want more of it. The earliest concepts of combat
stealth were developed in the submarine, then incorporated in aircraft, but now are being extended into other platforms
and media. Stealth, from the beginning, enabled the submarine to engage at will. Until nuclear power provided its
propulsion, however, the submarine could not always disengage at will.[15] Within the AAN wargaming effort, there
has been an examination of the ability of an engaged army, if not to be stealthy, at least to be able to disengage at will-a characteristic never before possessed by any but the smallest of ground warfare units.[16]
Although air power advocates argue that air forces can also disengage at will, even without stealth, the increasing
dedication of Air Force resources and platforms to the support of ground forces (unless a more independent role for air
power is pursued, post-Kosovo) challenges this assertion. The vulnerability of highly visible aircraft such as transports,
tankers, air-breathing surveillance vehicles (both manned and unmanned), and airborne lasers suggests that measures
are needed to increase the survivability of these platforms. Certainly examining these mission requirements in a joint
wargame could contribute to understanding the theoretical and practical applications of low observability, and to
comparing alternative means to achieve joint objectives.
Long-range Precision Strike
The dilemmas of extended-range operations have been examined in a number of service-specific wargames in which
the United States military is tasked to reach into vital areas when denied its traditional power projection advantages of
access within the region. While this scenario most often has been used to strain the predominantly short-range
assumptions in Air Force modernization plans, and to argue for the consideration of added investments in long-range
aircraft, such research into theory and practice could clearly profit from a joint perspective. For example, because a
sudden enemy land grab in a faraway region could rapidly harden into a fait accompli, additional thought (and
practice) should be given to the pre-hostilities phase of a distant contingency.
How to use joint forces as a tool of coercive diplomacy should be addressed, not only to identify important concepts
of conventional deterrence and flexible deterrent options, but also to generate joint options to support preemptive and
preventive measures such as no-fly or no-drive zones, mining, blockades, and shows of force. Although game players
are often reluctant to edge up to thresholds for the use of weapons of mass destruction, the consideration of long-range
conventional ballistic missiles launched from submarines can add an important element combining both stealth and
precision strike. But that option is likely to be quickly rejected if the wargaming of extended-range operations seeks
only Air Force-oriented solutions.[17]
Reduced Logistics Footprint
From Joint Vision 2010, to the QDR, to the NDP, there is unanimous agreement on the need to tailor logistics to
support the rapid deployment of joint forces, and to diminish the size of the logistics footprint in forward areas.
Moreover, while the focus of service-specific wargames frequently remains on single-service-dominated combat
operations, there is considerable agreement that the logistics in support of these operations will increasingly depend on
joint resources, organizations, and management. For example, a logistics cell at a recent wargame of extended-range

operations was very willing to follow the NDP's recommendations for a joint logistics command that would integrate
the functions of Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency. That group also stressed the growing
importance of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to future joint deployments, along with the relative advantages of air
transport over sealift as forces get lighter, distances greater, and time-lines shorter.
In future wargames these trends must be weighed against Army and Marine Corps reliance on organic artillery that
might compose as much as 75 percent of an engaged unit's logistic tail. As these packages are downsized, those units
will increasingly require naval surface fire support and air power to supply combat fires when and where needed.
These are issues already under study by the AAN effort, but they clearly require joint investigation and
experimentation.
Command and Control
Unfortunately, the traditional concept of "command and control" is often subsumed in large wargames under the
broader, almost all-encompassing acronym "C4ISR"--command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance--which in the aggregate provide the basis for "information dominance" or
"information superiority." While the interactions of all these elements are surely of importance on future joint
battlefields, attempting to lump them all under one grand overarching concept may be too much to grasp, even for
wargames confined to single services. Put another way, it is important for the separate services to understand and
appreciate each other's command and control capabilities so that the result is enhanced operations in joint areas of
responsibility. For example, in a recent wargame in which USAF forces were crying out for defense against lowobservable cruise missiles, few players understood the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (an integrated,
sensor-based fleet air defense system), nor did they appreciate the contributions that an enhanced E-2C Hawkeye (the
Navy and Marine Corps airborne surveillance and command and control platform) could bring to an air battle far from
the littoral in the year 2005. Similarly, there has been a lack of joint understanding and appreciation regarding the
battle management potential of the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS): the Army and
Air Force do not always agree about the platform's role in collecting and disseminating information for air-land battle
operations; the Navy is just beginning to investigate how to capitalize on maritime forces through Joint STARS
connectivity.
Now and in the future, battle management is much more than searching sensor data to pass to weapon delivery
platforms along service-specific lines. It includes the tasking and control of sensor operations, interpreting sensor data
in terms of the "Blue" commander's operational concept and intent, matching platforms and weapons to targets--not
through some automatic space-based link, but through the active engagement of a joint decision architecture--and
near-real-time battle damage assessment. Given the considerable reliance expected to be placed on commercial
communication systems to expand bandwidth and enhance situational awareness in the future, joint, networked
command and control is just the start of the "system of systems" required to manage future combat operations. Joint
wargaming can help piece together these nascent, and presently far-from-seamless, system architectures.
Conclusion
Given these areas of common interest, how and where should joint wargaming proceed? Bohr's quadrant gaming will
continue to be supported by the work done in think tanks across the country. Their work will be an important source of
both political and technical projections upon which applied research and gaming will feed. Similarly, games in
Edison's quadrant will remain the mainstay for generating and testing service-specific operational doctrine and tactics
within the realm of existing and planned platforms, weapons, and systems. Using inputs from both the Bohr and
Edison quadrants, the games in Pasteur's quadrant, directed and played in the joint arena, would generate, refine, and
test issues similar to those suggested above, look to the mid-term, and seek to combine theory and practice, concepts
and programs. Figure 2, building on Stokes's concept of research, suggests what a model approach to joint wargaming
looks like, in terms of who might be doing what.

Figure 2. The Stokes Matrix Applied to Wargaming.

We conclude that Pasteur's model should be emulated as wargames are developed, played, and evaluated to help
prepare the nation's military forces to face an uncertain future--together. In reaching that conclusion we've deliberately
stretched some analytical frameworks and extended some applications of wargaming. For example, with regard to the
Bohr quadrant in Figure 2, service think tanks and doctrine commands obviously have a "practical use." But such use
is indirect and lies outside the immediate operational domain. Clearly, more work needs to be done to apply these
frameworks and to fill in the conceptual and practical gaps that we have left uncovered.[18]
If it is difficult to deny the imperative of joint operations, it becomes equally hard to ignore the dividends of joint
wargaming. Writing in the Winter 1996-97 Joint Force Quarterly, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay L. Johnson
stated that adopting a joint vision equates to changing the way the Navy thinks and operates:
It is about a new kind of joint warfare which will enable us to optimize the capabilities of every ship,
submarine, and aircraft, . . . putting them in a joint context where they support and are supported by the
Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to maximize the full range of military power.[19]
If the services are ready to change the way they think and operate, we believe that a generous amount of joint
wargaming combining both theory and practice could help facilitate that change. And it occurs to us that those
presently best postured to help initiate that change are those experienced wargamers who are currently sporting purple
suits.
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